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Optimizely malware attack

A major cybersecurity incident involving website optimization platform Optimizely has exposed visitors to 178 organizations to malicious JavaScript designed to steal cryptocurrency, capture payment-card information, and compromise vulnerable Apple devices.

The attack, discovered by cybersecurity firm Report URI on November 16, involved 188 infected JavaScript snippets identified among 1,611 Optimizely scripts examined by researchers. Affected organizations included major brands such as Ledger, BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, HSBC, IKEA, and GitLab.

Rather than directly breaching each company’s infrastructure, the attacker exploited Optimizely’s trusted website experimentation software to distribute malicious code through customer websites.

The incident highlights a growing security risk for cryptocurrency users: attackers can redirect payments without accessing a victim’s private keys or compromising the wallet itself.

Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Reaches 178 Organizations

Optimizely provides website experimentation and personalization tools that allow businesses to test different page layouts, content, and user experiences.

Organizations integrate its JavaScript snippets into their websites, allowing visitors’ browsers to automatically load the platform’s code.

According to Report URI researcher Scott Helme, attackers inserted malicious instructions into customer-specific JavaScript projects. This allowed the compromised code to be distributed through scripts that affected websites already trusted.

The investigation identified 188 infected scripts belonging to 178 organizations after examining 1,611 Optimizely snippets.

The affected organizations operated across multiple industries, including banking, financial services, technology, retail, media, and cryptocurrency.

Among the identified companies were:

  • Crypto and trading: Ledger, IG, OANDA’s Coinpass, Interactive Investor, and TMS Brokers.
  • Technology: Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, and Bitly.
  • News and media: BBC, CNN, Fox News, and NPR.
  • Financial services: HSBC and Equifax.
  • Retail: IKEA, ASOS, and American Eagle.

The actual number of affected websites may be higher because researchers could only examine scripts they were able to identify and collect.

How Hackers Hijacked Crypto Payments Without Stealing Private Keys

The most concerning part of the attack involved a malicious script designed to identify cryptocurrency wallet addresses and replace them with addresses controlled by the attacker.

According to Report URI and Hudson Rock, the malware supported multiple blockchain networks, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, other EVM-compatible networks, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Dogecoin.

The malicious code could modify wallet addresses in several locations:

  • Text displayed directly on webpages.
  • Cryptocurrency payment forms and input fields.
  • Website links and images containing wallet addresses.
  • Clipboard operations when users copied an address.
  • Certain browser navigation and sharing operations.

For example, a visitor attempting to send Bitcoin to a legitimate payment address displayed on an infected website could unknowingly copy a substituted address.

When the user pasted that address into a cryptocurrency wallet and approved the transaction, the funds would be transferred to the attacker’s destination.

Importantly, this technique does not require the attacker to obtain the victim’s seed phrase or private key. The wallet can operate normally and authorize the transaction exactly as instructed by its owner. The problem is that the destination address has already been manipulated.

Hudson Rock reported no evidence that the recovered malware directly extracted wallet seed phrases or used wallet-signing functions to initiate unauthorized blockchain transactions.

This distinction makes address substitution particularly dangerous: users may believe their wallets are secure while unknowingly sending funds to a fraudulent destination.

Malware Also Targeted Payment Cards, Cookies, and iPhones

Cryptocurrency theft was only one component of the malicious software.

Researchers found that the payload was expanded during November 16 to include additional capabilities targeting payment information and mobile devices.

Payment Card Information Was Targeted

The malicious script contained functionality designed to identify credit card numbers, expiration dates, and security codes entered into website payment forms.

When the required information was detected, the malware attempted to transmit the details to an attacker-controlled server.

However, researchers identified an important limitation: card information entered into separately hosted payment frames, such as those provided by Stripe and Adyen, was outside the script’s reach. Cards entered directly into a website’s own form fields were potentially exposed.

Cookies and Screenshots Could Also Be Captured

The malware also included functionality to collect certain browser cookies, page URLs, and screenshots.

Cookies that were not marked as HttpOnly could potentially be accessed by the script. This created additional risks for visitors who were logged into sensitive services while browsing affected pages.

Older iPhones and iPads Were Targeted

The attack also delivered two iOS exploit kits known as Coruna and DarkSword.

According to Report URI, the malicious script identified visitors’ iOS versions and attempted to load exploit chains targeting vulnerable devices.

The researchers documented different attack paths for older iOS versions, including devices running iOS 13 through 17 and certain iOS 18 versions.

This expanded the incident beyond cryptocurrency and payment fraud, making it a broader browser-based security threat.

Approximately $7,000 in Cryptocurrency Reached Attacker Wallets

Report URI identified several cryptocurrency addresses associated with the malicious payload.

As of approximately 19:25 UTC on November 16, the wallets had received around $7,040 in cryptocurrency, according to the firm’s investigation.

The reported amounts included:

  • Bitcoin: Approximately $5,380.
  • Litecoin: Approximately $762.
  • TRON-based assets: Approximately $719.
  • Ethereum: Approximately $100.
  • BNB Smart Chain USDT: Approximately $82.

These figures represent observed transactions to the identified wallets, not a definitive accounting of all funds stolen during the campaign. Some of the wallets had been active before the Optimizely incident, making it difficult to attribute every transaction directly to the attack.

Nevertheless, the findings indicate that the campaign resulted in cryptocurrency transfers reaching attacker-controlled destinations.

How Optimizely Responded to the Security Incident

Optimizely confirmed that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow to insert malicious JavaScript into some customer projects.

The company told BleepingComputer that it had blocked access to the vulnerable path and deployed a security fix.

Its response also included:

  • Removing injected code from affected customer projects.
  • Ending active sessions.
  • Revoking access tokens.
  • Resetting access for affected user accounts.
  • Blocking malicious code delivery through Cloudflare.
  • Notifying affected customers.

Report URI’s monitoring showed that most of the infected scripts had been cleaned by late November 16. At 21:52 UTC, only one of the 188 previously identified infected snippets still contained the malicious code.

However, cleanup does not establish whether every potentially exposed visitor avoided harm. The full impact on individual customers and visitors remains a separate question.

Why Third-Party Website Tools Create Security Risks

The Optimizely incident demonstrates how a security weakness in a single software provider can affect numerous organizations without attackers directly compromising each company’s servers.

Businesses routinely integrate third-party services for analytics, advertising, website personalization, customer support, and payment processing.

These integrations often receive permission to execute JavaScript inside visitors’ browsers. If attackers gain access to the systems that control those scripts, malicious instructions can potentially reach many websites at once.

This is commonly described as a software supply chain attack.

The incident also reinforces the importance of security measures such as Content Security Policy (CSP), script integrity monitoring, restricted third-party permissions, and regular reviews of externally loaded JavaScript.

Report URI noted that an appropriately configured CSP could have blocked key parts of the attack before they succeeded.

What Cryptocurrency Users Should Do to Stay Safe

Although Optimizely says it has fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code, users who visited affected websites during the incident should take precautions.

Cryptocurrency users should:

  1. Verify every wallet address: Compare the first and last characters of the destination address against the original source before approving a transaction.
  2. Avoid blindly trusting copied addresses: Clipboard contents can be manipulated by malicious software.
  3. Check recent transactions: Review transfers made after interacting with affected websites, particularly on November 16.
  4. Monitor payment cards: Contact the card issuer if suspicious charges appear after entering payment details on potentially affected websites.
  5. Update Apple devices: Install the latest available iOS or iPadOS security updates.
  6. Review account activity: Look for unusual sessions, account changes, and suspicious login activity.

Users should also remember that hardware wallets do not automatically prevent address-substitution attacks. A hardware wallet can securely sign a transaction while sending funds to the wrong address if the user approves a manipulated destination.

Optimizely Incident Highlights a New Risk for Crypto Payments

The Optimizely incident demonstrates that cryptocurrency security extends beyond exchanges, wallets, and blockchain networks.

Even when private keys remain protected, malicious software running inside a trusted website can manipulate the information users rely on when making payments.

With 188 infected scripts identified across 178 organizations, including Ledger, BBC, CNN, HSBC, and Salesforce, the incident highlights the potential reach of compromised third-party website services.

Optimizely has confirmed that it fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code. However, the incident serves as a reminder that users should independently verify transaction details rather than relying solely on the apparent trustworthiness of a website.

For cryptocurrency holders, checking the destination address before confirming a transfer remains one of the simplest and most important security precautions.

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial or cybersecurity advice.

By Fazzio

Fazzio is a cryptocurrency writer at CryptoNews.guru, covering digital assets, blockchain technology, market trends, and the latest developments in the crypto industry. Passionate about financial markets and emerging technologies, She delivers clear, insightful, and up-to-date crypto news and analysis.